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SEX DISCRIMINATION: CONTINUING
CLARIFICATIONS BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT'
David L. Gregoryt
INTRODUCTION
During the 1993-1994 term, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit provided helpful clarifications of
the law prohibiting sex discrimination and sexual harassment
in employment.' Sex discrimination, and especially sexual
harassment, continue to be among the most highly charged
and visible areas of employment discrimination law.2 Indeed,
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Michelle Darvin, Jeffery B. Fannell and Patrick R. Scully, St. John's University
School of Law Class of 1996, provided meticulous, thoughtful research assistance.
1 Sexual harassment is a prohibited category of unlawful sex discrimination.
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC') Guide-
lines state:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for em-
ployment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
29 C-F.R. § 1604.11 (1994).
The EEOC Guidelines have been cited with approval by the United States
Supreme Court. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993);
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
' The single highest award thus far in an individual case of unlawful sexual
harassment is the $7.1 million awarded in Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, No.
943043, 1994 WL 636488 (Cal. Super. Sept. 30, 1994). See Jane Gross, Jury
Awards $7.1 Million in Sex Case, N.Y. TIES, Sept. 2, 1994, at A6. Ms. Weeks,
employed as a legal secretary for less than two months by Baker & McKenzie, the
largest law firm in the world, was repeatedly subjected to unwelcome physical sex-
ual harassment by Martin R. Greenstein, then an intellectual property partner in
the law firm. Mark Boennighausen, $7.2 Million Secretary, THE AMERICAN L WYER,
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President Clinton has been sued in federal district court for
sexual harassment allegedly committed while he was the gov-
ernor of Arkansas.3 The academic and popular literature on
October 1994, at 76. Ms. Weeks sued both Greenstein and Baker & McKenzie,
accusing the latter of not taking reasonable steps to stop the harassment. Id. At
her trial "Weeks accused Greenstein of touching her breast while reaching over
her shoulder from behind and putting M&M candies in the pocket of her blouse.
Then, she claimed, Greenstein pulled her arms back and stated: 'let's see which
[breast] is bigger.'" Id. Furthermore, Ms. Weeks established that "the firm's failure
to do anything other than scold Greenstein after the last complaint before Ms.
Weeks brought suit," resulted in liability because "the firm failed 'to take reason-
able steps' to prevent the sexual harassment of plaintiff from occurring." Id. Six
other female employees of the firm came forward at trial to testify that, prior to
Ms. Weeks's experience, they suffered from similar inappropriate conduct by
Greenstein. Id. At trial, the jury awarded Weeks $6,900,000 in punitive damages
against the law firm, for failing to investigate and to stop the reported incidents
of sexual harassment, with an additional $225,000 in punitive damages against
Greenstein. Weeks, 1994 WL 636488 at *1. The judge subsequently reduced the
punitive damages of Baker & McKenzie from $6,900,000 to $3,500,000. Sex-Harass-
ment Award Reduced, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at A22. In doing so, the judge
stated that "[a]lthough the firm failed to take reasonable steps to protect Ms.
Weeks and other women, its conduct 'was not the product of a deliberate and
purposeful policy aimed at violating the rights of anyone." Id. The $225,000 puni-
tive damage award against the former partner was left intact. Id. Weeks has
accepted the reduced award. Mark Boennighausen, Baker Plaintiff Accepts $3.5
Million in Damages, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Dec. 13, 1994, at 3. Baker &
McKenzie has indicated that it will, nevertheless, appeal the entire award. Law
Firm Appeals 3.8-Million Sex-Harassment Award, LA. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1994, at 24.
This case has been the subject of numerous articles. See, e.g. Boennighausen,
supra, at 76. (discussing, through an investigative report interviewing the six
woman and six man jury, the manner, intensity and seriousness with which they
approached the resolution of this case); Gross, supra at A16 (Reporting that
"Baker & McKenzie . .. said the firm had made great strides in the treatment of
sexual harassment complaints since Ms. Weeks' lawsuit .... The firm brought in
a consultant who worked with the Navy after the Tailhook sexual harassment case
and developed a videotape about the correct way to handle such situations."); Vic-
toria Slind-Flor, Megafirm Socked in Punitives, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 12, 1994, at A4
(indicating that the size of the punitive damage award is indicative of a disgust
for these types of practices by a law firm but that the outstanding size of the
award may "bring punitive damages back to the attention of the U.S. Supreme
Court"); see also, Tom Lewin, Chevron Settles Sexual Harassment Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A16. (Reporting that "Chevron Corporation agreed yester-
day to pay $2.2 million to settle sexual harassment charges that were brought by
four female employees who said they had been the targets of a barrage of offen-
sive jokes, e-mail messages and comments about their clothes and body parts, and,
in one case, sadistic pornography sent through the company mail. Lawyers for the
women, only one of whom still works for Chevron, said they believed that the
settlement was probably the largest ever in a harassment case.")
' Paula Jones filed her complaint on May 6, 1994 against President Clinton
and Danny Ferguson, a state trooper assigned to security for then-Governor
Clinton. Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902, 904 (E.D. Ark. 1994). Her complaint
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alleged that the defendants' actions constituted hostile work environment sexual
harassment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 904. Section 1983 mandates that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Jones made the following three additional claims: (1) that President Clinton
deprived her of her constitutional rights to equal protection and due process under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (2) that
defendants were guilty of intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) that
the President defamed her. Jones, 858 F. Supp. at 904.
Jones's complaint revolved around incidents occurring while President Clinton
was the Governor of Arkansas. Complaint, Jones v. Ferguson, No. LR-C-94-290,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5739 (E.D. Ark. May 6, 1994). Jones worked as an employ-
ee of the Arkansas Industrial Developmental Commission. Id. at *2. She claimed
that while working at the registration desk during a governors' conference on May
8, 1991, she was approached by Danny Ferguson. Id Ferguson allegedly gave her
a piece of paper with a four digit number on it and a note that said "the Gover-
nor would like to meet with you." Id at *3. She claimed that after some specu-
lation about the Governor's intention, and after deciding it was in her best inter-
est to follow the instructions on the note because it might lead to advancement
she went to Governor Clinton's hotel room. Id. at *4. She alleged that Governor
Clinton then made sexual advances to her. Id. at *5. The most egregious of these
claimed advances was that Governor Clinton 'lowered his trousers and underwear
exposing his erect penis and asked Jones to 'kiss it'" Id. at *5. Jones claimed that
she rejected Governor Clinton's advances, at which time he pulled up his trousers
and told her that if she were to get into any trouble he would take care of it. Id.
at *6. He then allegedly said that "you're smart. Let's keep this between our-
selves." Id. While she did not report the incident, in the next few days she alleg-
edly told a friend, her sisters and her mother of the incident. Id. at *7. She al-
leged that Ferguson continued to make certain comments to her regarding Gover-
nor Clinton's continued desire to see her. Id. at *9.
Ms. Jones contended that her career was adversely affected by these encoun-
ters. She claimed that certain superiors began treating her "rudely" and that she
was transferred to a position that required no responsible duties for which she
could be adequately evaluated to earn advancement. Id. at *10. She also contended
that she was not given the appropriate pay increase that accompanied her now
position. Id. Furthermore, she contended that a certain article in The American
Spectator was defamatory. Id. at *1L This article stated that a woman named
"Paula" was "available to be Clinton's regular girlfriend if he so desred." Id.
On July 21, 1994, President Clinton moved to dismiss the complaint on
grounds of presidential immunity and to defer the filing of any other motions or
pleadings until the issue of immunity was resolved. Jones, 858 F. Supp. at 903.
The Eastern District of Arkansas granted this motion. Id. at 906-07.
That court, in an opinion filed on December 28, 1994, held that "a President
[does not have] absolute immunity from civil causes of action arising prior to as-
suming the office," and denied the President's motion to dismiss on grounds of
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sexual harassment is voluminous.4 Despite the heightened
national consciousness of sexual harassment in the wake of the
October 1991 confirmation hearings of now-Associate Justice
Clarence Thomas, there is no evidence that the incidence of
sexual harassment has abated.5 In fact, perhaps because of
presidential immunity. Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D. Ark. 1994). It
did hold, however, that President Clinton had limited, temporary immunity. Id.
The case for both President Clinton and Ferguson was put on hold only for trial
purposes, not for purposes of discovery and depositions. Id. at 699-700.
For a discussion of President Clinton's immunity claim, see Akhil Reed Amar
& Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: the Nixon and Clinton
Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701 (1995).
' The term "sexual harassment" was first made popular by Catharine
MacKinnon's landmark book, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN
(1979). Since that time, sexual harassment, conceptualized as a legal theory within
the meaning of the already cognizable cause of action for unlawful sex discrimina-
tion, has received extensive written commentary. On March 21, 1995, a Westlaw
search for all law review articles containing the phrase "sexual harassment" found
hundreds of such articles.
The popular film, Disclosure, based upon the novel by Michael Crichton,
achieved a box office gross of $70 million in its first seven weeks in U.S. theaters.
Ted Bunker, Leaders and Success, INVESTORS Bus. DAILY, Feb. 7, 1995, at Al. As
of June 13, 1995, the film grossed $83 million in domestic theaters and $129 mil-
lion in foreign theaters. Claudia Eller, The BizlClaudia Eller: Company Town; At
the Box Office, Literary Prestige Is One for the Books, LA. TIMES, June 13, 1995,
available in, LEXIS, NEWS Library, LAT File, at *4. The book and the film depict
"reverse" sexual harassment of a male subordinate employee by a female corporate
executive in the computer industry.
Several prominent books have discussed extensively the Justice Clarence
Thomas-Professor Anita Hill hearings before the United States Senate Judiciary
Committee in October of 1991. See, e.g., DAVID BROCK, THE REAL ANITA HILL: THE
UNTOLD STORY (1993); JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE
SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994); RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER:
ESSAYS ON ANITA HIL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). In addition, there has been significant dis-
cussion in law review literature. See, e.g., Mary I. Coombs, Telling The Victim's
Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277 (1993) (discussing the difficult road women take
when reporting sexual harassment); David R. Dow and Richard A. Westin, What
We Should Learn From the Hill v. Thomas Fiasco, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COM-
MENT. 81, 87 (1991-92) (arguing that the real problem with the Senate hearings is
that "[alttention to judicial qualities has been supplanted by a searching inquiry
into how he or she is likely to develop (or impede) areas of constitutional law that
touch upon politically contentious topics. The consequence is that the hearing pro.
cess now has as its primary activity the spectacle of senators and the nominee
playing artful cat and mouse games over how the nominee can be expected to rule
on not-so-hypothetical cases."); Karen Lebacqz, Justice and Sexual Harassment, 22
CAP. U. L. REV. 605 (1993) (discussing how deeply rooted and internalized societal
and cultural perceptions of black women affected the view of Anita Hill's testimo-
ny and deprived her of justice); Shirley L. Mays, Sexual Harassment and the Law:
Justice or "Just Us"?, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 623 (1993) (criticizing views that declare
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the new national awareness, allegations of sexual harassment
increased dramatically in the wake of the Thomas-Hill hear-
ings .
6
The Second Circuit discharged its duty to guide discrimi-
nation and harassment litigants in the district courts within
the contours of several recent pertinent decisions by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court." This Article will focus on two sex-
discrimination-in-employment decisions by the Second Circuit
this term,8 Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.9 and Karibian v.
that Thomas's actions were acceptable in the African American culture because it
is insulting to all women, feeds stereotypes and fails to recognize power differen-
tials).
The Hill-Thomas hearing was also the subject of an entire issue of the South-
ern California Law Review in 1992, covering 394 pages and containing twenty six
authors' essays and articles. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Gender, Race and the
Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of the Anita HillIClarence
Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 1467 (1992) (discussing the unique problems
of African American women who accuse men of sexual harassment, in that they
must overcome both racism and sexism); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science u. Myth: the
Failure Of Reason In the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1399
(1992) (discussing how the hearings were infested with sexual stereotyping and
-reminding the reader that sexual harassment is not about love, romance or inti-
macy but about power); Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harassment: The Nature of the
Beast, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1445 (1992).
c See, e.g., Bonnie Miller Rubin, Ouster of Top Execs Raises Sexual Harass-
ment Issue to New Level, CHi. TRIB., Apr. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, CEI F file (noting that year after Thomas-Hill hearings, number of Sexu-
al harassment charges received by the EEOC rose by 53%, the largest increase in
the agency's history); Suing a Corporation Is No Easy Matter, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, LAT file (5,623 sexual harassment charg-
es filed in 1989, while 14,000 charges expected to be filed in 1994).
' Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (prohibiting unlawful
sexual harassment without reference to its emotional impact on the plaintiff, and
reaffirming "abusive work environment" theory of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986)); Price Waterhouse v. Hopldns, 490 U.S. 228 (1939).
' Several interesting, but peripheral, decisions of the Second Circuit during the
term are beyond the immediate scope of this Article. The court has repeatedly
determined that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not the exclusive
remedy for unlawful sex discrimination in employment and does not preclude a
lawsuit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Annis v. County of
Westchester, 36 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1994); Gierlinger v. New York State Police, 15
F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1994); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134 (2d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 1189 (1994). The Second Circuit has also dis-
cussed retaliatory discharge in the context of pregnancy, Kelber v. Joint Indus. Bd.
of the Elec. Indus., 27 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1994), and gender harassment in higher
education, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994).
9 9 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Columbia University,"° both of which interpret and extend
recent Supreme Court precedents. While Cosgrove seems to
favor employers' interests, limiting the damages assessed for a
recognized retaliatory discharge, Karibian greatly broadens
employers' potential liability for sexual harassment.
I. COSGROVE V. SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co."'
The Second Circuit's decision in Cosgrove v. Sears Roebuck
& Co. illustrates how the court will apply the analysis and
rules from the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins2 to Title VII cases. In Price Waterhouse, the Court
explained that Title VII does not require a showing by the
plaintiff that a discriminatory motive was the sole cause of an
employment decision." According to the Court, "Title VII
meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of
" 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
" 9 F.3d 1033 (2d Cir. 1993).
12 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The case involved the failure of Price Waterhouse, a
nationwide accounting firm, to promote Ann Hopkins, a productive senior manager,
to partner. Id. at 233-34. Hopkins sued in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, alleging sex discrimination in the decisionmaking process. Although
Hopkins had substantial professional qualifications, id., the partners at Price Wa-
terhouse cited her poor interpersonal skills as fatal to her bid for partnership. Id.
at 234. Nevertheless, many of the partners' comments indicated that their negative
reactions to Hopkins's personality were the results of sex stereotyping. For exam-
ple, one partner explained to Hopkins that her subsequent bids for partnership
would be strengthened if she walked, talked and dressed "more femininely." Id. at
235. A social-psychologist testified at trial that the evidence indicated that the
partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was infected with sex stereotyp-
ing. Id. at 235-36.
The district court found that Price Waterhouse had legitimately emphasized
interpersonal skills in rejecting Hopkins, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F.
Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985), but it also concluded that the partners relied on
sex stereotyping to come to that decision. Id. According to the district court, such
reliance constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. Id. Therefore, Price Water-
house could only avoid equitable relief by proving by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have rejected Hopkins absent this discrimination. Id. The court of
appeals approved the district court's conclusions by holding that if a plaintiff
proves that discrimination played a role in an employment decision, the defendant
will not be liable if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
made the decision in the absence of discrimination. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
825 F.2d 458, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court generally endorsed the
view of the court of appeals, but concluded that a clear and convincing standard
of proof was too demanding. Id. at 252-53.
' Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
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legitimate and illegitimate considerations." 4 The plaintiff
retains the burden of persuasion at all times, as provided by
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine but
once prima facie discrimination is proven, the employer can
offer the mixed motives explanation as an affirmative de-
fense.16 The Court held that once a plaintiff shows that gen-
der played a motivating part in an employment decision, an
employer may avoid liability if it proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have made the same decision if it
had not allowed gender to play such a role. 7
In Cosgrove, the Second Circuit held that even if an em-
ployer cannot prove that it would have made the challenged
decision without considering gender, evidence of a legitimate
reason for the employer's decision can greatly reduce the
employer's exposure to compensatory and punitive damages.
Patricia Cosgrove brought a Title VII sex discrimination action
against her employer, Sears, Roebuck & Company. She alleged
that Sears discriminated against her in both compensation and
promotion because of her sex,18 and ultimately fired her in
retaliation for a sex discrimination complaint she had filed
with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC").1
Five years after being hired by Sears as a sportswear
buyer's assistant, Cosgrove was promoted to the position of
assistant merchandise controller on November 1, 1974.2"
14 Id. at 241.
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
1 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246.
17 Id. at 253. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 modifies the holding of Price Water-
house so that a plaintiffs proof of an illegitimate motivating factor suffices to
establish a violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1988 & Supp. IT 1991). This proof
alone, however, will trigger only declaratory and some injunctive relief. The em-
ployer can still escape the consequences of the challenged employment action and
payment of damages by proving that it would have taken the same action for an
existing non-discriminatory reason. See MICHAEL J. ZIMIER, ET AL, CASES AI4D
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 176-77 (3d ed. 1994). This change
was not applicable in Cosgrove because the Civil Rights Act has been ruled to
have only prospective effect. See, e.g., Landgraf v. US.L Film Prods., 114 S. Ct.
1483 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
" Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1035.
She also alleged unlawful sexual harassment in the worhplace and that,
following her termination from employment, Sears had impeded her efforts to
obtain new employment. Id.
"2 Id. at 1036.
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Cosgrove received an overall rating of "adequate" in August
1976.21 She expressed frustration with her performance rating
in comparison to similarly-situated co-workers and with her
salary.' Sears contended at trial that Cosgrove's poor inter-
personal skills were responsible for her job performance rating.
Her immediate supervisor testified that after Cosgrove met
with him and the head of the department, her performance
deteriorated.' In October 1977 she received an even worse
performance evaluation. On October 31, 1977, she filed her
first charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC, alleging
unequal compensation, failure to promote, denial of training,
discriminatory job evaluations, and refusal to let her view her
personnel file.24
On December 2, 1977, the department head met with
Cosgrove and outlined the job-performance areas in which she
had received poor ratings. She was given sixty days, or until
January 31, 1978, to improve her performance.' According to
the Sears management procedure manual, following the De-
cember 2 meeting, at least one subsequent meeting should
have been scheduled between Cosgrove and the department
head to discuss her situation. No such meeting ever took
place.26 At the December 2 meeting, Cosgrove complained of
offensive remarks allegedly made to her by male co-workers.27
She claimed Sears never investigated her complaints, although
Sears contended it investigated all of her harassment allega-
tions.'
On Jiuuary 5, 1978, Cosgrove filed a second charge
against Sears with the EEOC, alleging that her poor perfor-
mance evaluation on December 2, 1977 was in retaliation for
her complaint with the EEOC.29 Although Sears denied it had
any knowledge of the first charge until January 1978, there
was evidence that Cosgrove's department head knew of the
21 Id. at 1036.
22Id.
2s Id. at 1036-37.








original EEOC charge as early as mid-December 1977.2'
Cosgrove was terminated from Sears on February 6, 1978. Her
termination papers were prepared on January 24, 1978, one
week before the sixty-day period to demonstrate improved job
performance would have lapsed. 1
Following her termination, Cosgrove conducted an exten-
sive job search.12 She later claimed that Sears was uncoopera-
tive by not responding to a call for a reference and by return-
ing an incomplete job reference form.' On April 22, 1980,
Cosgrove filed an amended charge with the EEOC of post-ter-
mination retaliation against Sears.' On June 5, 1981, after
the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to Cosgrove, she filed a
discrimination and retaliation suit against Sears in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.3
A. The District Court's Decision
The district court found that Cosgrove demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that Sears had knowledge of her
sex discrimination claim, and that such knowledge played a
motivating role in its decision to terminate Cosgrove." How-
ever, the court also accepted the testimony of several Sears
witnesses who testified that Cosgrove communicated poorly,
maintained a messy office, was abrasive and disorganized, and,
in her last months, was increasingly uncommunicative with
her supervisors. 7 The court concluded that Sears was not lia-
ble for retaliatory discrimination because it had shown "that
its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to
make the same decision."3
The court also found that there was no evidence of post-
termination retaliation against Cosgrove. The court explained
that the volume of Cosgrove's unsuccessful job applications





Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 81 Civ. 3482, 1992 WL 8718, at *17
(S.DN.Y. Jan. 10, 1992).
37 Id.
Id. at *18, (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989)).
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alone was not sufficient to prove that Sears was obstructing
her job search.39
As for Cosgrove's claim of unlawful sex discrimination in
both compensation and promotion, the court stated that a
plaintiff must either prove that an employer had a discrimina-
tory intent ° or that "some employment practices, adopted
without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation
be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination." 1
The evidence in Cosgrove's case focused on statistical dispari-
ties and on the competing explanations for those disparities.42
The court found, based on comparative statistics of similarly
situated male and female Sears employees provided by the
company, that there was no gender discrimination in respect to
promotion or pay.43 Moreover, the court inferred, from all the
evidence presented, that promotions and compensation increas-
es were attributable to differences between the performance of
individual employees, and not to unlawful employer distinc-
tions between the sexes." Thus, the court concluded that
Cosgrove failed to show either unlawful disparate treatment or
disparate impact in employment due to her sex.45
Finally, as for Cosgrove's sexual harassment claim, the
court found that, based on an offensive anonymous note and
remarks made by two co-workers, she did not show that the
harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the condi-
tions of her employment to create an actionable abusive work-
ing environment.46 The district court dismissed Cosgrove's
complaint with prejudice.
' The court stated that Cosgrove showed commendable energy in seeking to
find employment elsewhere and her suspicion that Sears must have been black-
listing her could not be dismissed as unreasonable. However, the court went on to
explain that "suspicion does not rise to the level of proof, particularly in a case
where the two written responses by Sears which are in evidence are more consis-
tent with letting Cosgrove down easily than with blacklisting her." Id. at *20.
' Id. at *20, (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
986 (1988)).
41 Id. (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 987).
Cosgrove, 1992 WL 8718 at *23.
43 Id. at *23.
" Id.
'Id.
,4 Id. (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
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B. The Second Circuit's Decision
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment
dismissing Cosgrove's claims of gender discrimination, sexual
harassment and post-termination retaliation. 7 The court of
appeals held, however, that Cosgrove had successfully made
out a claim of retaliatory discharge and remanded the case for
a determination of damages.
The Second Circuit noted that a plaintiff alleging retaliato-
ry discrimination under section 704(a) must make a prima
facie showing of discrimination by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.' In order to make a prima facie case, the plaintiff
must show that: "(1) she was engaged in an activity protected
under Title VII; (2) the employer was aware of the plaintiffs
' The court of appeals also affirmed the district court decision that Cosgrove
failed to prove her sex discrimination claims. Since all but one of the employees
similarly situated to Cosgrove, both male and female, were promoted faster than
Cosgrove and received correspondingly higher salaries, the court found that
Cosgrove failed to demonstrate gender discrimination with regard to pay increases
and promotions. Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1041.
The court stated that in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie show-
ing of sexual harassment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she is a member of
a protected group; she was the subject of unwelcome advances; the harassment
was based upon her sex; and, the harassment adversely affected a term, condition
or privilege of employment. Id. at 1042 (citation omitted). The plaintiff must also
demonstrate that a supervisors or coworker's actions should be imputed to the
employer. Id. (citing Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d
59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992)). The court found that Cosgrove failed to establish this requi-
site prima fade case because, while she was a member of a protected group and
was the subject of unwelcome remarks and advances because of her gender, she
failed to demonstrate that the alleged harassment adversely affected a term, condi-
tion or privilege of her employment, or that the actions of her coworkers should
be imputed to Sears. Id. The court thus affirmed the district court decision deny-
ing Cosgrove's sexual harassment claim. The court also affirmed the district court's
judgment dismissing Cosgrove's post-termination retaliation claim because Cosgrove
offered no substantive evidence that Sears misrepresented her poor job perfor-
mance at Sears. Id.
I Id. at 1038. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from firing workers in retaliation for opposing alleged discriminatory practices.
Section 704(a) provides in relevant part that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any prac-
tice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or be-
cause he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1964).
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participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer took
adverse action against plaintiff based upon that activity; and
(4) a causal connection existed between the plaintiffs protected
activity and the adverse action by the employer."49
The court held that the facts established at trial demon-
strated that Cosgrove's claim satisfied all the elements of a
prima facie case: she filed an EEOC complaint against Sears
and Sears was aware of this, but did not follow its own proce-
dures for addressing employee performance deficiencies in
terminating Cosgrove." Thus, the court concluded that a pri-
ma facie case was made that Sears retaliated against Cosgrove
because she filed an EEOC complaint against Sears."
Once a prima facie case is established by the plaintiff, the
burden of production shifts to the employer to demonstrate a
.'legitimate non-discriminatory reason' for its action.52 Where
a mixed motive exists, the employer will not prevail simply by
offering a legitimate reason for its decision, if that reason did
not motivate it at the time of the decision." The employer
must show that it would have made the same decision based
on the legitimate factor alone.' The court found that Sears's
failure to comply with its own manual regarding follow-up
counselling and evaluation, its premature preparation of
Cosgrove's termination papers, and its knowledge of Cosgrove's
charge filed with the EEOC required the conclusion that, as a
matter of law, Sears's decision to terminate Cosgrove was
motivated, at least in part, by illegitimate reasons.5 The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed the decision of the district court on
Cosgrove's retaliation claim, and remanded for a calculation of
damages.56 The court stated, however, that Cosgrove was only
entitled to relief "for the period between when she was dis-
charged based upon the discriminatory factor, and when she
would have been discharged based upon her performance
' Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1039 (citing Sumner v. United States Postal Service, 899
F.2d 203, 208-09 (1990).
" Id.
51 Id.
62 Id. at 1039 (quoting Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209, quoting Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
Ms Id. at 1040 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989)).
r' Id. at 1040 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45).
Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1040.




The remedy afforded Cosgrove does not seem consistent
with the logic underlying Price Waterhouse. The district court
found that despite the fact that Cosgrove had proven prima
facie retaliatory discharge, her supervisors had other legiti-
mate concerns that, standing alone, warranted her termina-
tion.' The district court cited Cosgrove's poor performance
and lack of interpersonal skills as sufficient reasons for dis-
charge.
59
The Second Circuit disagreed with the trial court's applica-
tion of the Price Waterhouse "mixed-motives" component of
Cosgrove's retaliation claim. The court of appeals first ex-
plained that an employer cannot prevail in a mixed-motives
case if the independent legitimate reason for its adverse deci-
sion was not, in fact, a motivating factor when the decision
was made.6" The court noted that Cosgrove was denied an
opportunity to improve her employment performance when she
was deprived of standard follow-up counselling and the benefit
of the full probationary term to demonstrate improved job
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1040. For further discussion of the Price Waterhouse decision, see
Robert Belton, Symposium, The United States Supreme Court's 1988 Term Civil
Rights Cases, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law Revisited:- Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV.
1359 (1990); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition M. Price Waterhouse and
the Individual Employment Discrimination Case, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1023 (1990);
Roy L. Brooks, The Structure of Individual Disparate Treatment Litigation After
Hopkins, 6 LAB. L. 215 (1990); Martha Chamallas, Symposium, A Fair Hearing,
Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hophins, 15 VP. L.
REV. 89 (1990); ; Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action
and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TE.. L.
REV. 17 (1991); Candace S. Kovacic-Fleishcher, Proving Discrimination After Price
Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 A. U. L. REv. 615
(1990); Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107 (1991); Kelly R. Dahl, Note,
Price Waterhouse, Wright Line, and Proving a 'Mixed Motive" Case Under Title
V!I, 69 NEB. L. REV. 869 (1990); Margaret E. Johnson, Comment, A Unified Ap-
proach to Causation in Disparate Treatment Cases: Using Sexual Harassment by
Supervisors as the Causal Nexus for the Discriminatory Motivating Factor in Mixed
Motives Cases, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 231 (1993); Michael A. Zubrensky, Note, Despite
the Smoke, There is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives Em-
ployment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959 (1994).
Cosgrove, 1992 WL 8718 at *18.




performance.6 ' Therefore, because the employer truncated its
processes prematurely, the court concluded that there was no
way to determine whether the company's stated procedures
would have improved Cosgrove's job performance and atti-
tude. The court then reasoned that Sears could not state
with certainty that it would have terminated Cosgrove for the
legitimate reasons subsequently proffered if it did not know
whether those reasons would have existed at the time of the
termination, assuming proper procedures had been followed.6"
Accordingly, "Sears must bear the cost of its lost opportuni-
°,,)64
The fact that Sears could no longer assert independent
legitimate reasons for termination would seem to return the
case to a simple retaliatory discharge claim. In fact, the Su-
preme Court is clear on this scenario:
We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her
gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the de-
fendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same deci-
sion even if it had not taken the plaintiffs gender into account."
Cosgrove prevailed on her retaliatory discharge claim, but
rather than treating the case as though she had proven retalia-
tion outright, the Second Circuit suggested an inadequate, and
decidedly pro-employer, compromise. The court directed Sears
to pay Cosgrove only for the period between her actual dis-
charge and the date "she would have been discharged based on
her performance alone.6 6 Thus, although the Second Circuit
ostensibly rejected Sears's mixed-motives argument, the court's
damage theory effectively decided that Sears's reasons for
Cosgrove's termination were legitimate and would have even-
tually led to her discharge. Ultimately, Sears was held liable
technically but was allowed to escape the consequences of its
unlawful discharge of Cosgrove. In so doing, the Cosgrove court
undercut the meaning of Price Waterhouse. The de minimis




" Id. at 1041.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
Cosgrove, 9 F.3d at 1041.
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deter future instances of unlawful retaliation.
I. KARTBIAN V. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY6
The Second Circuit decision in Karibian v. Columbia Uni-
versity confronts two ostensibly narrow technical questions
regarding the proper analysis of sexual harassment claims.
The court considered whether a quid pro quo plaintiff must
have suffered actual economic loss and, more specifically, de-
fined the agency principles underlying employer liability for a
hostile work environment. The ruling reveals much about how
the Second Circuit will employ the overarching quid pro quo
and hostile work environment paradigms in future cases, espe-
cially in light of the virtually absolute liability standard it has
imposed on corporate employers.
A. The Facts of Karibian
Sharon Karibian, a former Columbia University employee,
brought a Title VII suit against Columbia University and her
former supervisors, alleging sexual harassment. In 1987, while
a student at Columbia University, Karibian worked in the
University's 'Telefund" fundraising office, sponsored by
Columbia's Office of University Development and Alumni Rela-
tions ('CDAR7).' Telefund was administered by Philanthropy
Management Company ("PMF'), an independent contractor
staffed by both PMI and Columbia employees. 9 Karibian, a
university employee, was supervised by defendant Mark Ur-
ban, Development Officer for Annual Giving at UDAR.' Ur-
ban had the authority to alter Karibian's work schedule and
assignments and to give her promotions and raises, subject to
approval. He also had apparent authority to fire Karibian.7 '
According to Karibian, Urban repeatedly invited her out to
bars, ostensibly to discuss work-related issues. 2 On those oc-








casions, Urban often asked Karibian back to his apartment. 3
At first Karibian rebuffed Urban's advances; ultimately, how-
ever, Urban succeeded in coercing her into a physically violent
sexual relationship. 4 Karibian claimed that the conditions of
her employment-including her raises and working
hours-varied depending on her sexual acquiescence to Ur-
ban. 5 She also claimed that she believed she would be fired if
she did not acquiesce to Urban's demands. 6
In September 1988, Karibian met with a member of Co-
lumbia University's Panel on Sexual Harassment. She reported
that she was afraid her supervisor would retaliate against her
if she ceased complying with his demands for sex.7 Shortly
thereafter, Karibian met with Columbia University's Equal
Opportunity Coordinator. 8 According to Karibian, on both
occasions she was discouraged from actively pursuing a formal
complaint against Urban.79 At Karibian's request, both meet-
ings remained confidential and neither complaint resulted in
any investigation of Urban."
In April 1989, Karibian told her immediate supervisor,
Loren Spivak, of an especially violent sexual encounter with
Urban." Spivak, a PMI employee, notified PMI's president,
Ron Erdos, but neither reported the incident to Columbia Uni-
versity. 2 In July 1989, Karibian was promoted to Project Di-
rector, the highest position within Telefimd. In this position
she reported directly to Urban at UDAR.' In January 1990,
Karibian complained to the Director of Development Services
at UDAR that she was afraid of being terminated by Urban
and that Urban was "sabotaging" her work at Telefund.84 Her
complaint was brought to the attention of John Borden,
UDAR's Deputy Vice President. At approximately the same














time, Karibian met once again with Columbia University's
Equal Opportunity Coordinator, this time dropping her request
for confidentiality, and thereby granting permission for the
Coordinator to speak to others at Columbia University about
her difficulties with Urban.s
After an investigation by Columbia University, Urban was
forced to resign. 6 In August 1990, Columbia University closed
the Telefimd office and Karibian was laid off. She then brought
her suit against Columbia University, Borden and Urban,
claiming that the sexual harassment to which she was sub-
jected violated Title VIIY
B. The District Court's Opinion
The district court granted Columbia's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Karibian's complaint. The court began
its analysis by recognizing that Title VII encompasses two
forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work
environment.' In rejecting Karibian's quid pro quo claim, the
Karibian, 14 F.3d at 776.
SId.
8 Id.
Karibian v. Columbia University, 812 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). One
of the most difficult and important questions in all of employment discrimination
law is what constitutes a hostile work environment.
In Cortes v. Mfaxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1992). the court
stated that a hostile work environment claim required proof of:
(1) membership in a protected group; (2) subjection to unprovo"ed sexual
advances, or request for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature; (3) but for her sex, the plaintiff would not have been
the object of the harassment (4) the harassment was sufficiently perva-
sive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive or hos-
tile working environment; and (5) the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.
Id. at 198-99.
Cf, Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir. 1994)
("The principal questions to be answered are whether the plaintiff was in fact
sexually harassed to a degree that [adversely influenced] the conditions under
which she worked, whether it was unwelcome harrassment, whether management
knew or should have known about the harrassment yet failed to take appropriate
remedial action."). Carr, however, is flawed. 'Welcome sexual harassment' is an
oxymoron; if... the employee demonstrates by word or deed that the
harassment' is welcome ... it is not harassment* and, therefore, unwelcome ha-
rassment is not an element of a hostile work environment cause of action. Id. at
1008-09.
But see, Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995). The Fuller
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court held that this theory requires proof of "an actual-rather
than threatened-economic loss because of gender, or because
a sexual advance was made and rejected." 9 Because Karibian
produced no evidence demonstrating a denial of an economic
benefit, and had in fact been promoted and received salary in-
creases during her time at Telefund, the district court found
court held that in order to succeed on a hostile work environment claim the plain-
tiff must prove that: "(1) she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature; (2) this conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the conduct was 'sufficient-
ly severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and cre-
ate an abusive working environment." Id. at 1527 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991)).
The circuits have developed differing objective standards for hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment. See e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (factfinder must keep in mind both the woman's and
the man's perspective when determining whether the behavior constitutes sexual
harassment); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.3d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990)
(factfinder must consider whether the harassment would detrimentally affect a
reasonable person of the same sex in that position); Paroline v. UNISYS Corp.,
879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (determination made from the point of view of
the victim), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Gebers v. Commercial
Data Ctr. Inc., No. 93-4011, 1995 WL 9262 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995) (objective
component measured by a reasonable person standard); Dey v. Colt, 28 F.3d 1446,
1454 (7th Cir. 1994) (effect the conduct would have on a reasonable person in the
plaintiffs position); Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir.
1993) (consider the impact the alleged harassment would have on a reasonable
employee in the same position); Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1527 (reasonable person with
the same fundamental characteristics, including sex, race, age, disability and sexu-
al orientation).
The circuits have also developed differing gradations for determining when
conduct reaches a level sufficiently severe or pervasive. See e.g., Spain v. Gallegos,
26 F.3d 439 (3rd Cir.1994) (since intent to discriminate on the basis of sex can be
demonstrated through actions not sexual by their very nature, rumors of an
employee's sexual relationship with a fellow employee may constitute sexual ha.
rassment; however, this situation requires a more intensive factual inquiry); Harris
v. Clyburn, No. 94-1009, 1995 WL 56634 at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 1995) (occasional
tickling in the hallway is insufficient to prove severe or pervasive conduct when
that was the only evidence of sexual harassment); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524
(4th Cir. 1994) (the conduct of a police lieutenant's supervisor which constituted,
among other things, calling plaintiff "honey" and "dear," showing up at plaintiffs
scheduled meetings when he was not involved, accusing her of having an extra.
marital affair, and asking her what kind of underwear she wore clearly constituted
behavior that was sufficiently severe and pervasive); Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs.
Corp, 46 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1995) (isolated and innocuous incidents do not
support a finding of sexual harassment, because they do not "poison ... the
workplace"; therefore, plaintiff failed to prove hostile work environment sexual
harassment when she introduced evidence that on one occasion, her employer
removed his shoe and rubbed her leg under a table and on another occasion, he
grabbed plaintiffs buttocks).
' Karibian, 812 F. Supp. at 416.
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that Karibian stated no valid claim under the quid pro quo
theory.9'
The court also rejected Karibian's hostile work environ-
ment claim. The court ruled that a plaintiff suing under this
theory must prove that "the employer either provided no rea-
sonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but
did nothing about it."' The court found there was no reason-
able basis for her contention that Columbia University failed to
provide a reasonable avenue for making complaints.' As for
the knowledge requirement, the court held that Columbia
University could not be expected to act against Urban as a
result of the confidential consultations of September 1988.'
In response to Karibian's contention that Columbia University
should have taken action in April 1989 when she notified her
PVI supervisor of Urban's conduct, the court ruled that notice
to PMI was not notice to Columbia University, and that PMrs
knowledge was not knowledge by Columbia University.' As a
result, "[tlhe events of April 1989 did not impose on Columbia
any duty to take remedial action against Urban."
C. The Second Circuit Opinion
1. Karibian's Quid Pro Quo Claim
The first question regarding Karibian's quid pro quo claim
on appeal was whether an employee had to suffer actual eco-
nomic loss to sustain a charge of quid pro quo harassment."6
Karibian's failure to show evidence of actual, rather than
threatened, economic loss proved fatal to her claim in the dis-
trict court. 7 The Second Circuit pointed out that such a re-
quirement contradicts Title VII and the EEOC guidelines as
elucidated in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson."8
'3Id.
91 Id. (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc. 957 F.2d 59, 63
(2d Cir. 1992)).
92 Id.
'3 Id. at 417.
4Id.
"Karibim, 812 F. Supp. at 417.
Karibian, 14 F.3d at 776.
" Id. at 776.
SI Id. at 778 (citing Mleritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.. 57, 64 (1986)).
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Meritor was the Supreme Court's first decision unanimous-
ly condemning unlawful sexual harassment.99 In Meritor, the
Court contrasted quid pro quo harassment with 'conduct...
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment."'100 There is no mention in Meritor of whether a viable
quid pro quo claim of unlawful harassment could be stated
without some economic loss or benefit tied to the rejection of,
or submission to, sexual advances.
The Second Circuit began its analysis by referring to the
EEOC Guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment. The court
ruled that quid pro quo harassment occurs when "submission
to or rejection of [unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual
is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual.""' To establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo
harassment, the court held that a plaintiff must present evi-
dence that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct, and
that her reaction to such conduct was then used as grounds for
decisions adversely affecting the compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of her employment.0 2 Because the quid pro
quo harasser, by definition, wields the employer's authority to
alter the terms and conditions of employment, the employer is
strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment.0 3
The court of appeals rejected the district court's ruling
that actual economic loss is required in order for a plaintiff to
prevail under the quid pro quo theory."0 The court reasoned
that in cases where the employee refuses her supervisor's ad-
vances, evidence of some job-related economic penalty will
often be available; such evidence, however, is not always essen-
tial to a quid pro quo claim."0 The court focused, instead, on
the behavior of the supervisor, observing that:
In the nature of things, evidence of economic harm will not be avail-
able to support the claim of the employee who submits to the
supervisor's demands. The supervisor's conduct is equally unlawful
under Title VII whether the employee submits or not. Under the dis-
See supra note 124.
1*0 Meitor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR § 1604.11 (a)(3)).
"' Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778 (citing 29 C.FR. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1993)).
102 Id.
103 Id.




trict court's rationale, only the employee who successfully resisted
the threat of sexual blackmail could state a quid pro quo claim. We
do not read Title VII to punish victims of sexual harassment who
surrender to unwelcome sexual encounters. Such a rule would only
encourage harassers to increase their persistence.C'
The court held that the key inquiry in a quid pro quo case
is "whether the supervisor has linked tangible job benefits to
the acceptance or rejection of sexual advances."'" Quid pro
quo harassment occurs when a supervisor conditions any terms
of employment upon an employee's submitting to unwelcome
sexual advances, regardless of whether the employee rejects
the advances and suffers the consequences or submits in order
to avoid those consequences."'
Karibian stated that her work assignments, raises and
promotions depended on her sexual acquiescence to Urban.
Moreover, she claimed that Urban implicitly threatened to fire
her if she did not submit to his demands. If Karibian's conten-
tions were true, "Urban's conduct would constitute quid pro
quo harassment because he made and threatened to make
decisions affecting the terms and conditions of Karibian's em-
ployment based upon her submission to his sexual advanc-
es."' In granting summary judgment, the district court im-
properly removed this question from the factfnder."' The
Second Circuit admonished the district court for tying quid pro
quo analysis to the retention or loss of "tangible" job bene-
fits."' The problem is that without evidence of such a loss, it
is harder to find the workable demarcation between the quid
pro quo and hostile work environment theories of harassment.
The court explicated its understanding of the quid pro quo
standard by distinguishing between "rejection" and "submis-
sion" quid pro quo harassment."' When the employee sub-
mits to sexual advances to avoid adverse employment conse-
quences, it is no less actionable than when the employee
spurns the overtures and suffers adverse treatment as a re-
106 Id.
-07 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778.
"a Id. at 778-79.
11 Id. at 778.
no Id. at 779.
n, Id. at 778.
n2 I&. at 778-779.
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suIt.113 Furthermore, the focus should remain "on the pro-
hibited conduct, not the victim's reaction."11 4
Whether a tangible benefit or loss actually occurs, the
court held that the supervisor's linking of a tangible job benefit
to an unwelcome sexual advance indicates quid pro quo sexual
harassment. Thus, in the Second Circuit, it appears that a
claim of quid pro quo harassment, which is automatically im-
puted to the employer, may properly proceed to trial without
any evidence of a tangible gain or loss by the plaintiff. In a
submission case, the factfinder will determine whether the
plaintiff submitted to advances out of a "reasonable fear" of
some job-related reprisal."5 The flexibility of the Second Cir-
cuit interpretation seems to expand significantly upon the
theory of harassment that the Meritor Court termed "economic
quid pro quo."" 6
2. Karibian's Hostile Work Environment Claim
Unlike the quid pro quo unlawful sexual harassment case,
a plaintiff suing under the hostile work environment theory
must demonstrate some specific basis to hold the employer
liable for its employees' misconduct."7 In Karibian, the Sec-
ond Circuit limited its previous holding in Kotcher v. Rosa &
Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., cited by the district court, that
to prove a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must
prove that the employer "either provided no reasonable avenue
for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about
it.""8 The court ruled that this standard is not applicable to
all hostile work environment claims," 9 although a plaintiff
"must demonstrate some specific basis to hold the employer
liable for the misconduct of its employees. 2 ' The court went
on to say, however, that this basis of employer liability unfor-
" Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779.
114 Id.
116 Id.
'" 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
117 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779.
.. Id. (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 63
(2d Cir. 1992).
'19 Id.
Id. (citing Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 62).
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tunately "remains elusive." 2' Quoting the 1993 decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Forldift Systems,
Inc., the court simply stated that a work environment is hostile
"[w]hen the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intim-
idation, ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or per-
vasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment."'2
221 Id.
Id. at 779; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993)
(quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57, 65, 67 (1986)). In
Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held that hostile work: environmnt
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. In order to be actionable within the meaning of Title VII,
the conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Whether sexual harassment actually occurred is
not based upon whether the plaintiff 'voluntarily" partook in the activity, but
rather on whether the advances were "unwelcome." Id. at 68. In Harris, the Court
attempted to further define the type of conduct that will be actionable as an abu-
sive work environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII The Court reject-
ed the district courtes determination that psychological damage is a necessary
element of the cause of action. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. Instead, the Court de-
fined the limits of what constitutes a hostile work environment according to an
objective assessment of the alleged behavior and the perception of the victim-
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VIrs purview. Like-
wise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be
abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the
victim's employment, and there is not a Title VII violation.
Id. at 370. While the Court did not define when conduct reaches this level, it did
list a number of factors that provide guidance: (1) the frequency of the conduct;
(2) its severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening;, and (4) whether it "unrea-
sonably interferes with an employee's work performance.! Id. at 371.
While this decision does rule out the need to show psychological harm, it
provides relatively little substantive guidance as to how the lower courts should
determine when there is a hostile work environment. See David Schultz, From
Reasonable Man to Unreasonable Victim?; Assessing Harris v. Forldift Systems and
Shifting Standards of Proof and Perspective in Title VII Sexual Harassment Law,
27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717 (1993) (discussing various legal standards used by
courts in sexual harassment law, arguing that "reasonable" standards be aban-
doned because of inherent problems and advocating a 'balancing of interests" test
in their stead); Kathleen A. Gleeson, Comment, Constitutional Law-Civil Rightsa
Act-Title VII-Sex Discrimination-Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harass-
ment-The United States Supreme Court Held that an Employer's Conduct Need
Not Seriously Affect an Employee's Psychological Well-Being or Cause the Empcee
to Suffer Tangible Injury to Be Actionable as Hostile Work Environment Harass-
ment in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Harris Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc., 33 DUQ. L. REV. 173 (1994) (arguing that the lach of clear standards
as to when conduct becomes actionable will lead to "a rash of inconsistent verdicts
and damage awards"); Bradley Golden, Note, Harris v. Forldift: The Supreme
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Most significantly, the court held that lack of notice to the
employer and the existence of complaint procedures do not
automatically insulate an employer from liability.1" Follow-
ing Supreme Court precedent, the court employed principles of
agency, and held that an employer is liable for an abusive
work environment created by a supervisor if the supervisor
uses actual or apparent authority to further the harassment,
or if the supervisor is otherwise aided in accomplishing the
harassment by the existence of the agency relationship."
Court Takes One Step Forward and Two Steps Back on the Issue of Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 1151 (1994) (criticizing the
Court's use of an objective standard and advocating a reasonable victim standard,
because men can also be victims of sexual harassment); Mary C. Gomez, Note,
Sexual Harassment After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.-Is it Really Easier to
Prove?, 18 Nova L. Rev. 1889 (1994) (arguing for the application of the reasonable
woman standard in sexual harassment); Leah R. McCaslin, Note, Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.: Defining the Plaintiffs Burden in Hostile Environment Sexual Ha-
rassment Claims, 29 TULSA L.J. 761 (1994) (arguing that both the elimination of
the need to prove psychological harm and the use of a reasonable person standard
were proper); Marren Roy, Comment, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: A
Search for New Standards in the Wake Of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 48
SMU L. REV. 263 (1994) (criticizing Harris for failing to address employer liability
standard and for failing to give guidance in applying the applicable standards).
' Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73.
'" Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779-80. The Court in Meritor did not make a clear
determination regarding the appropriate standard for holding employers liable for
supervisors' conduct in hostile work environment cases, but it did reject a strict
liability standard and endorsed a standard that looks to agency principles for guid-
ance. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that
an employer's "grievance procedure and policy against discrimination, coupled with
[the plaintiff's] failure to invoke that procedure, must insulate [the employer] from
liability." Id.
Meritor is the Court's definitive ruling that hostile work environment sexual
harassment is actionable, but its holding caused confusion, especially in terms of
its mandate that the corporate employer liability standard be formulated by gener-
al agency principles. For discussion of this case, see Sheryl A. Greene, Reevalua-
tion of Title VII Abusive Environment Claims Based on Sexual Harassment after
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 13 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 29 (1988) (arguing for a
reevaluation of remedies available under Title VII in light of hostile work environ-
ment cases); David Holtzman & Eric Trelz, Recent Developments in the Law of
Sexual Harassment; Abusive Environment Claims after Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 31 ST. LouIs U. L. J. 239 (1988) (sexual harassment allegations should be
evaluated using the, reasonable victim's viewpoint, and plaintiffs alleging harass-
ment by a supervisor should be able to hold an employer liable absent a showing
of negligence); Anne C. Levy, The Change in Employer Liability for Supervisor
Sexual Harassment after Meritor: Much Ado About Nothing, 42 ARM L. REV. 795
(1989) (arguing that cases and commentators have misinterpreted the Meritor
Court's mandate on employer liability because of a misunderstanding of agency
principles and reevaluating the problem with a clearer description of those princi-
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The court reasoned that when a supervisor makes employment
decisions b.sed on an employee's response to sexual advances,
it is fair to hold the employer liable because "the supervisor is
acting within at least the apparent scope of the authority en-
trusted to him by the employer."'
Applying these principles, the court found that Columbia
University could be held liable for Urban's alleged harassment
regardless of the absence of effective notice to Columbia or the
reasonableness and efficacy of the university's internal com-
plaint procedures. 6 The court rejected Columbia's contention
that holding it liable for Urban's harassment was contrary to
the standard of employer liability previously announced in
KotcherY The court reasoned that where a low-level super-
visor does not rely on supervisory authority to carry out the
harassment, the Kotcher standard of employer liability general-
ly will apply.' Such a standard is inapplicable in this case,
the court held, because Karibian's claim alleged Urban utilized
his supervisory authority over her employment to force her to
submit to his sexual advances.' If the factfinder accepts
Karibian's allegations, Columbia University should be held
liable.13 The district court's grant of summary judgment for
Columbia University was reversed, and the case was remanded
for further proceedings.
In its analysis of Karibian's hostile work environment
ples); Joseph AL Pellicciotti, Sexual Harassment in the Worhplace: A Consideration
of Post-Vinson Approaches Designed to Determine whether Sexual Harassment Is
Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 215 (1993) (arguing that low-
er courts still lack clear guidelines for evaluating alleged sexual harassment); Jan-
et Seldon, Employer Liability for 'Hostile Enuironment Sexual Harasment: Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 31 HOW. L. REV. 51 (1988) (questioning whether the
Courtes leaving open the question of employer liability will prompt EEOC to alter
its guidelines); Ronald Turner, Employer Liability under Title VfI for Hostile Envi-
ronment Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Personnel: The Impact and Aftermath
of Mferitor Savings Bank, 33 HOW. L. J. 1, 47 (1990) (arguing that agency princi-
ples are helpful, but should not be determinative and that courts "should take into
account the nature of the prohibited conduct and an employer's effort to protect its
work force from harassment").
' Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2a 897,
910 (11th Cir. 1982)).
126 Id,
"' Id. at 781.





claim, the Second Circuit addressed an area explicitly left open
by the Court in Meritor.13' Meritor's indication that common
law agency principles should control the question of employer
liability for a hostile work environment was not only summari-
ly endorsed; it was dramatically tightened to approach near-
absolute corporate principal liability.132 The court's earlier
decision in Kotcher, however, seemed to preclude employer
liability without notice to the employer and absent the
employer's failure to provide a reasonable internal avenue for
complaint." The court explained that it had indicated in its
earlier ruling that notice and lack of complaint procedures
were not "absolute" requirements and that the acts of a super-
visor could rise to a level high enough that they would "neces-
sarily be imputed to the company."" 4 The court concluded
that "an employer is liable for the discriminatorily abusive
work environment created by a supervisor if the supervisor
uses his actual or apparent authority to further the harass-
ment, or if he was otherwise aided'. . . by the existence of the
agency relationship."''
13 Karibian, 14 F.3d. at 779.
232 Id. at 779-80.
' Id. at 780 (citing Kotcher, 957 F.2d at 63).
134 Id.
" Id. Agency law analysis can be very intricate and the circuits vary widely on
the range of corporate employer liability for acts of supervisory personnel. See
Kiessens v. United States Postal Serv., No. 93-1823, 1994 WL 718952 (1st Cir.
Dec. 28, 1994) (holding that court must determine whether the employer knew or
should have known of the alleged sexual harassment and failed to take prompt
action). Accord Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3rd Cir. 1994) (finding that law re-
quires the employer take to some affirmative remedial action concerning sexual ha-
rassment by coworkers); Bouton v. BMW, 29 F.3d 103 (3rd Cir. 1994) (applying
negligence standard to determine whether the employer was liable in a hostile
work environment case; thus failure to investigate and remediate will result in
liability; this standard mandates an effective grievance policy, defined as one that
is known to the victim and one that timely stops the harassment). Spicer v. Vir-
ginia Dept. of Corrections, 44 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that remedial
response is not sufficient solely because plaintiff does not complain after remedial
steps are taken; response must still be prompt and adequate); Parolino v. Unisys
Corp. 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that an employer is liable if it had
actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and took no prompt and ade-
quate remedial action); cf. Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th
Cir. 1993) (asserting that standard is not one of respondeat superior, but is in-
stead a negligence standard closely resembling the "fellow servant rule;" thus, em-
ployer, provided that it has used due care in hiring the offended employee, is
liable for its employees' torts against coworkers only if it knew, or had reason to
know, of the misconduct and failed to take appropriate remedial action); Fuller v.
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3. Agency Principles and the Distinction Between Quid
Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment
The agency law discussion in Karibian was very abbreviat-
ed. This cursory consideration of agency law issues is quite
problematic. The distinctions between a supervisor linking job-
related decisions to unwelcome sexual conduct (quid pro quo
harassment) and one wielding delegated authority to create a
hostile work environment are complex and were not sufficient-
ly elucidated by the court. It is certainly arguable that the
supervisor's actual or apparent authority is indeed the authori-
ty to control compensation, terms and conditions of employ-
ment. The Second Circuit, for whatever reason, did not provide
a thorough analysis of the complex agency law principles that
would distinguish employer liability for the two different types
of claims. The highly charged political consequence is that
corporate employers will bear virtually absolute liability for all
of the sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisory person-
nel. The court held that an employer is strictly liable when a
high-level supervisor creates a discriminatorily abusive work
environment if the supervisor "uses his actual or apparent
authority to further the harassment, or if he was otherwise
Oakland, Nos. 92-16081 & 92-16402, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9148 (9th Cir. Feb.
14, 1995) (holding that employer is liable for failing to remedy haras3ment of
which it knows or should have known and that remedies must be reasonably cal-
culated to end the harassment; thus employer's obligation is not discharged until
prompt, effective action has been taken to end current harassment and deter fu-
ture harassment).
Furthermore, inaction cannot fairly be said to qualify as a remedy reasonably
calculated to end the harassment. Bouton, 29 F.3d at 106-07 (Holding that prior
conduct towards women should alert an employer to the likelihood that the em-
ployee would, despite warnings, try to harass the present plaintiff; therefore, there
is a duty to act to prevent the harassment as well as to act after the fact.). But
see Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990) (using respondeat supe-
rior standard and asserting that if there was actual or constructive knowledge and
the employer failed to take adequate remedial measures, then the employer will be
liable); Gebers v. Commercial Data Ctr., Inc., No. 93.4011, 1995 WL 9262 (6th Cir.
Jan. 10, 1995) (applying respondeat superior to impose liability). For an excellent
review of the pertinent decisions of the federal courts of appeal regarding the
scope of corporate employer liability for sexual harassment committed by supervi-
sors, see Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liability for 'Hos-
tile Work Enwironmenr Sexual Harassment Creatcd by Supervisoro: The Search for
an Appropriate Standard, 25 U. MEMS L. REV. 667 (1995).
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aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the
agency relationship."136 By contrast, where a low-level super-
visor does not rely on his supervisory authority to carry out the
harassment, the situation purportedly is more akin to harass-
ment carried out by the plaintiffs co-worker. In such a situa-
tion the employer will not be liable unless "the employer either
provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the
harassment but did nothing about it.""
The standard of strict liability for an employer for the
actions of a supervisor "at a sufficiently high level in the hier-
archy""3 8 is based on the court's application of section 219
(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.139 Although the
court's application of agency principles arguably resulted in a
proper decision based on the facts before the court in Karibian,
as a general rule imposing near-absolute liability on employ-
ers for hostile environment harassment carried out by high-
level supervisors is a simplistic and problematic approach to
an exceedingly complex issue.
In quid pro quo harassment, which occurs when an
employee's response to a supervisor's unwelcome sexual ad-
vances is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting
that employee, an employer is held strictly liable.4 Strict
liability is imposed because the supervisor's power to retaliate
comes directly from improper exercise of the actual or apparent
authority granted by the employer.' This is a proper result,
because without such authority the supervisor could not condi-
tion job benefits on the employee's submission to his sexual
advances.
The court in Karibian used an analysis similar to that
employed in quid pro quo cases to find that Columbia Universi-
ty could be held liable for the hostile work environment creat-
ed by Karibian's supervisor. Because the supervisor abused his
delegated authority to create a discriminatorily abusive work
126 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780.








environment,' the employer was strictly liable. Under the
particular set of facts presented in Karibian, where the super-
visor allegedly told Karibian that she "owed him" and where
he allegedly intimidated her by threatening to make decisions
affecting her employment based on her responsiveness to his
sexual advances,'43 strict liability is appropriate, even for a
hostile work environment action, because, like the quid pro quo
harasser, the supervisor here used his actual or apparent au-
thority to create an intimidating and abusive environment.
More troublesome, however, is the second prong of the
court's broad holding. Under that rule, an employer will be
strictly liable for a hostile work environment when a supervi-
sor is "otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the
existence of the agency relationship."' The liability link be-
tween the supervisor and the employer is more direct and
concrete when the supervisor uses his delegated authority to
further the harassment. That link can become tenuous, howev-
er, when the supervisor is merely "aided in accomplishing" the
harassment by the agency relationship.14"
The capacity of a person to create a hostile work environ-
ment is not necessarily enhanced or diminished by that
individual's authority. A hostile work environment can be
created independent of supervisory power, such as when a co-
worker engages in harassment. 4 ' This means, of course, that
a person can create a hostile work environment without an
agency relationship. Thus it is possible, theoretically and in
fact, for even a high-level supervisor to create an abusive envi-
ronment without abusing any authority delegated by the em-
ployer. In such a case the liability link is nonexistent; rather
than relying on strict liability, a plaintiff in this situation must
"demonstrate some specific basis" to hold the employer lia-
ble.147
In practice, however, under the court's broad holding, a
' Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780.
143 Id. at 776.
144 Id. at 780.
141 Id.
I Jack A. Raisner, The Return of Strict Liability: Wizen a Supervisor Creates a
Hostile Work Environment by Sexually Harassing a Subordinate, MPLOYMENT &
LAB. L. Q., Oct. 1994, at 2.
17 Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779.
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high-level supervisor charged with creating a hostile work
environment invariably will be viewed by the employee as able
to harass primarily because of his position in the company.
The employee naturally will be fearful that the supervisor will
use the authority delegated by the employer to retaliate. Thus
a plaintiff will always be able to show that-at least from her
perspective-the supervisor was "aided in accomplishing" the
harassment because of the agency relationship, i.e., because he
was a supervisor. Whether that supervisor in fact used his
supervisory authority to create the abusive environment be-
comes irrelevant. An employer is thus held strictly liable for
misconduct by supervisors, even though the supervisor did not
utilize the power granted by the employer to further his illicit
actions.
This strict liability standard transcends the quid pro quo
standard, where the basis for holding the employer liable is
that the agent used the employer's authority to alter the
employee's terms and conditions of employment. Under the
quid pro quo theory the liability link is the supervisor's active
exercise of his delegated powers. In contrast, holding an em-
ployer responsible under the theory that a supervisor was
"aided" in misconduct by the existence of the agency relation-
ship, could, in some instances, render the employer liable for
an abusive atmosphere created without any employer authori-
ty. In such a situation, the supervisor's actions are similar to
those of a harassing co-worker who also has no employer au-
thority. In order for a plaintiff to prevail in this situation, the
proper approach is to require her to show that the employer
either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of
the harassment but did nothing about it.
The employer should not be held strictly liable for a hostile
work environment created by a high-level supervisor unless
that supervisor exercised authority granted by the employer to
carry out the harassment. The "aided in accomplishing" lan-
guage used by the Karibian court, however, could lead to situa-
tions where the employer is strictly liable merely because the
supervisor was in a position to use delegated authority to re-
taliate against a subordinate. Even under the quid pro quo
avenue, the liability link is not passive; rather it is an active
exercise of the supervisor's authority. It should not be enough
that the supervisor was in a position to use his authority to
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further illicit actions, but that he did, in fact, use his authority
for an improper purpose.
Victims of sexual harassment should be compensated for
their injuries, and, where appropriate, the employer should be
liable. This puts a premium, however, on the proper applica-
tion of agency principles. In the absence of a liability link,
there is no legal basis for holding an employer strictly liable
for a hostile work environment. Absolute liability should not be
imposed on the employer in such situations. Corporate defens-
es, however, such as effective internal reporting mechanisms,
will almost always be unavailing. As a result of the Karibian
decision, the conceptual distinctions between quid pro quo and
hostile work environment sexual harassment may no longer
need to be as sharply drawn. Karibian's clarifications of corpo-
rate defendant liability standards for supervisory sexual ha-
rassment further plaintiffs' interests in deep-pocket recovery.
This practical result was achieved at the expense of theoretical
consistency in agency law.
CONCLUSION
In its Karibian and Cosgrove decisions, the Second Circuit
has further elucidated several critically important issues in sex
discrimination law. The court's analyses, however, have also
prompted new questions that will continue to challenge the
district courts in terms to come.
The Cosgrove decision indicates strict adherence to the
letter of Price Waterhouse. The existence of a legitimate reason
for adverse treatment of a Title VII plaintiff will only insulate
an employer from liability if the employer was in fact motivat-
ed by the legitimate reason at the time of the employer's deci-
sion. Defendants in the Second Circuit now also have the re-
sponsibility of demonstrating proper internal procedures in the
firing (or other adverse treatment) of a Title VII plaintiff, not-
withstanding the assertion of a mixed motive at trial. Cosgrove
also implies that if the employer puts forth some evidence of a
legitimate rationale for the adverse treatment of an employee,
that evidence will mitigate damages substantially. It is unclear
whether this is logically consistent with the mixed-motives
construct.
The Second Circuit's sexual harassment analysis in
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Karibian represents a clarification of how the court will apply
the quid pro quo and hostile work environment paradigms
delineated by the Supreme Court in Meritor. The Second Cir-
cuit position reinforces near-absolute employer liability for the
actions of a supervisor in either situation.
The significance of the Second Circuit's interpretation of
the quid pro quo paradigm reflects the realistic assessment
that the victim of harassment may submit without overt resis-
tance to unwelcome sexual advances. The court properly re-
fused to limit quid pro quo harassment to so-called "rejection"
cases and instead placed the factual focus on whether the sex-
ual advances were unwelcome. It is apparent, however, that
even a consensual sexual relationship between supervisor and
subordinate can quickly become very problematic for the Title
VII defendant if the continuation of the affair becomes linked
to the retention of tangible job benefits.
The Second Circuit's cursory consideration of the very
intricate agency questions raised by Meritor is the most signifi-
cant (non) development this term. In de facto repudiation of its
earlier Kotcher decision, the court held that the existence of a
reasonable avenue for complaint and a swift employer response
to the complaint will not necessarily immunize an employer
against liability for a hostile work environment. When a super-
visor uses actual or apparent authority to create a hostile work
environment, the employer will be held responsible for that
supervisor's actions whether or not the employer had notice of
the supervisor's behavior.
The court, unfortunately, suggested no circumstances in
which a supervisor would not be viewed as wielding actual or
apparent authority. Therefore, under Karibian, liability for
both quid pro quo harassment and a hostile work environment
involving a supervisor will be almost automatically imputed to
the employer. The court's avowed adherence to Meritor in this
instance seems inconsistent and represents a partial and un-
clear merging of the quid pro quo and hostile work environ-
ment paradigms.
The realistic result for employer defendants is ominous.
An employer in the Second Circuit is charged with knowledge
of all its supervisors' actions with respect to subordinate em-
ployees. Furthermore, if any supervisor participates in the
creation of a hostile work environment, no corporate policy or
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punishment of individual perpetration will relieve the
employer's liability as the principal. The Second Circuit has
made a fundamental policy choice, decidedly favoring plaintiffs
in sexual harassment cases, and making it virtually impossible
for corporate employers to disavow any harassing behavior by
supervisors.
The court, unfortunately, suggested no circumstances in
which a supervisor would not be viewed as wielding actual or
apparent authority. Therefore, under Karibian, liability for
both quid pro quo harassment and a hostile work environment
involving a supervisor will be imputed to the employer almost
automatically. The court's avowed adherence to Meritor in this
instance seems inconsistent and represents a partial and un-
clear merging of the quid pro quo and hostile work environ-
ment paradigms.

